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Gifts-Necessity for Competent Independent Advice to Sustain Gift
to Donee in Fiduciary Relation -This case involves certain property
owned by the deceased, R. H. Leathers, intestate. The closest of kin
were his nieces and nephews. Defendant, M. L. Leathers, was a neph-
ew of the deceased who with his family lived on the uncles' farm as
members of one family. In a short period before his death deceased
made gifts of about $4000 in land and money to the defendant and
members of the defendant's family. After the gifts deceased had $2700
in Government bonds left. The County Register drew up the deeds
at the request of the deceased. The defendant brought a notary public
to witness the acknowledgments in private with the deceased. R. H.
Leathers held the defendant and his family in high regard and always
spoke well of them. Evidence showed that the deceased was a man
of sound mind, but was ninety years of age, infirm and feeble. The
heirs brought suit to set aside the gifts. Held: For the plaintiffs, that
there was a relationship of confidence between the parties; that the
defendant was the dominant party; that it was necessary for the de-
fendant to show that Mr. Leathers had the benefit of independent
oounsel and advice and that he had failed to sustain that burden.
Turner et al v. Leathers et ux. 232 S.W. (2d) 269 (Tenn., 1950).
There exists a conflict in the cases as to the necessity of showing
that competent, independent advice was made available to the donor
where there was a confidential relationship between the parties. In the
instant case the court follows the strict view requiring proof that in-
dependent advice was available to the donor where there was a con-
fidential relationship, even though the donee does not actively seek the
gift, nor know of it in advance.1 The New Jersey Equity Court, the
leading exponent of this view, says that it will apply the rule of in-
dependent advice whenever a relation of trust and confidence exists
and the inequality favors the donee. Even where the case is free from
fraud and undue influence a gift of the bulk of the donor's estate will
not be sustained unless it clearly appears that he well understood the
effect and consequences of his act, and the indispensable evidence of
this understanding is that he had competent and independent advice.2
Other courts consider competent, independent advice only as evi-
dence on the question of whether or not there has been undue influence.
They hold that independent advice is not essential to the validity of a
gift where a fiduciary relationship exists, but absence of such advice is
a circumstance to be considered in determining whether a gift should
Ware v. Mulford, 79 N.J. Eq. 470, 82 A. 48 (1911).2 Reeves v. White, 84 N.J. Eq. 280, 134 A. 681, 53 A.L.RL 1115 (1926) ; Roosma
v. Roosma, 100 N.J. Eq. 280, 135 A. 79 (1926).
RECENT DECISIONS
be avoided because of undue influence or fraud.3 It is to be considered
with other surrounding facts and circumstances, such as the nature and
purpose of the gift, and the condition and relation of the parties.4
The instant case quoted a New Jersey opinion as follows:
"Proper independent advice in this connection means that
the donor had the preliminary benefit of conferring fully and
privately upon the subject of his intended gift with a person
who was not only competent to inform him correctly as to its
legal effect, but who was furthermore so disassociated from the
interests of the donee as to be in a position to advise the donor
impartially and confidently as to the consequences of His pro-
posed benefaction."
The New Jersey Court ruled that its requirement of competent,
independent advice was not met where a realtor, retained by the donor
to draw up a deed, suggested a will instead.8 The donee did not satisfy
the test where a lawyer merely explained the contents of an assignment
to the donor and the assignment was drawn up at the instigation of
the donee.7 The same result was reached in a case where a lawyer was
summoned by the donee only to draw a deed, without being in any
sense an advisor of the donor 3
Before the rule of competent, independent advice will be applied
there must be a relation of trust and confidence with one party more or
less dependent upon the other, and the gift must be of substantially
the whole of the donor's estate, or the bulk of it where the gift results
in the donor's impoverishment.
The defendants in the instant, case had equity on their side in that
they were good to the donor, took care of him and treated him as a
member of the family. The gift did not strip the donor of all of his
property, did not leave debts unpaid nor leave him at the mercy of the
donee. The donor had an opportunity to confer with the County Regis-
ter when they were alone making out the deeds. To rule that the donor
did not have the benefit of competent, independent advice and defeat
the gift seems an injustice to the defendants.
In Wisconsin there has been no decision upon the requirement of
3 Amado v. Aquirre, 63 Ariz. 213, 161 P.(2d) 117 (1945).
4Hawkins v. Gray, 128 Ark. 143, 193 S.W. 509, 28 C.J. 654 (1917) ; Burnham v.
v. Witt, 217 Cal. 397, 18 P.(2d) 949 (1933); Brown v. Canadian Industrial
Alcohol Co., 209 Cal. 566, 28 P. 613 (1938) ; Taylor v. Pivec, 149 Md. 526, 131
A. 757 (1926).
5 Post v. Hagan, 71 N.J. Eq. 234, 243, 65 A. 1026, 28 C.J. 654 (1907).
0 Kelly v. Kelly, 107 N.J. Eq. 483, 153 A. 384 (1931). '
7 Hackensack Trust Co. v. Nowacki, 124 N.J. Eq. 565, 3 A. (2d) 615 (1939).8 Post v. Hagan, Supra, note 5
9 Chandler v. Hardgrove, 124 N.J. Eq. 516, 2 A. (2d) 661 (1938) ; Dyer v. Smith,
112 N.J. Eq. 126, 164 A. 21 (1933) ; Slack v. Rees, 66 N.J. Eq. 447, 59 A. 466,'69
A.L.R. 393 (1904) ; In this case the gift stripped the donor of his property
without leaving anything to pay the donor's debts.
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competent, independent advice to a donor. The court has only required
that the donee sustain the burden of proving that there was no undue
influence where the parties were in a confidential relation and the donee
in a position of dominance. In Davis v. Dean the donor, an aged lady,
made gifts of real estate constituting the substantial, portion of her
estate to her grand-daughter and the grand-daughter's husband several
days before death. This gift cut off a daughter and several grand-
children. The husband, while in a position of trust and confidence with
the donor, showed an effort to keep those most interested in ignorance of
the pending gift. The gifts were set aside. Under these circumstances the
Court said that the defendant had the burden of proving that there was
no undue influence. It suggested that he should have given some of
the parties adversely interested an opportunity to be present when
the deeds were executed, or to be represented there by some chosen
friend or counsel, so that they would be cognizant of the whole trans-
action. Such evidence would aid in showing that the donee acted hon-
estly and fairly in the matter.10 Thus the donee in Wisconsin need not
affirmatively prove that the donor had the benefit of competent, inde-
pendent advice. The presence or absence of such advice will be con-
sidered as evidence on the general question of undue influence.
An interesting point was raised in Beilfuss v. Dinnauer."I In this
case the defendant, in trying to prove that there was no undue influence,
introduced testimony that the donor had conferred with a lawyer as
to procedure in making a gift of land to the defendant. This evidence
was admitted by the trial court, but rejected by the Supreme Court upon
appeal, on the ground that it was a privileged communication between
attorney and client. This creates a dilemma in a state following the
New Jersey rule as to competent, independent advice-which rule al-
most demands that a lawyer give the advice. 2
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Restitution- Recovery of Part Payments by a Defaulting Plaintiff -
Defendant brewing company contracted to sell beer to plaintiff and
his partner as wholsale buyers over a period beginning in 1946 and
ending in 1951. Upon execution of the contract, plaintiff and his part-
ner paid $20,000.00 "to secure performance of the contract," which
was to be applied to the last shipments of beer under the contract, but
if the contract was breached by the buyer, the deposit was to be used
to the extent of defendant's actual damages. Plaintiff warranted he
was a licensed dealer, but he in fact was not and was denied the neces-
20 Davis v. Dean, 66 W. 100, 26 N.W. 737 (1886).
11174 W. 507, 183 N.W. 700 (1921).
12 Wis. Stat. (1949) Sec. 325.22.
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